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MEASURING CULPABILITY BY MEASURING DRUGS?
THREE REASONS TO REEVALUATE THE ROCKEFELLER
DRUG LAWS
Susan N. Herman*
The so-called Rockefeller drug laws,1 enacted in 1973, have been
New York's principal weapon in the war against drugs for the past
three decades.
The statutory design, like the reasoning upon which it rests, is
simple and straightforward. The legislature chose to impose
lengthy and frequently mandatory sentences for possession and
distribution of controlled substances, on the assumption that harsh
and certain punishment would deter and reduce drug abuse and
related crime. 2  Under this system, drug offenses are graded
according to the dangerousness and the quantity of the drug
involved. 3 Dangerousness of a drug is determined by consulting
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A., Barnard College, 1968; J.D., New York
University, 1974. The author would like to thank Paul Gangsei and David Yassky for their
helpful comments, Chris Fowler for his excellent research assistance, Jim Peluso for his
extraordinary efforts in coordinating this symposium, and Brooklyn Law School for the
continuing support of its research stipend program.
I See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.00-.65 (McKinney 2000) (describing offenses involving
controlled substances); id. §§ 221.00-55 (McKinney 2000) (outlining offenses involving
marijuana); infra notes 92-103 and accompanying text (describing major, subsequently
enacted revisions to the drug laws).
2 See William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, N.Y. PENAL LAW art. 220, at 6
(McKinney 2000) (noting the structural changes in the Penal Law); STATE OF NEW YORK,
PROPOSED NEW YORK STATE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT AND REVISION OF ARTICLE 220 OF
THE PENAL LAW: INTERIM REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION TO EVALUATE THE
DRUG LAWS, LEG. DOC. NO. 10, at 59 (1972) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT] (stating that
higher penalties should be imposed on people who possess large quantities of drugs because
they "pose a greater threat to the community"); NATIONAL INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE NATION'S TOUGHEST DRUG LAW: EVALUATING
THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE: FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON NEW YORK DRUG
LAW EVALUATION 3 (1977) [hereinafter WEBSTER COMMISSION REPORT] (discussing the two
objectives of the drug laws: to "frighten" drug users and dealers enough to reduce drug use
and sales, and to reduce crimes, as "offenders would be deterred by the threat of 'get-tough'
laws").
3 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 59 (describing the penalty structure of the drug
laws according to the "dangerousness" of the drug and the likelihood the drug will be
distributed to others).
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detailed schedules of controlled substances, 4 with the drugs
considered most harmful listed in schedule I,5 and those classified
as the least harmful in schedule V.6 Dangerousness is also
evaluated by criteria described as objectively verifiable: potential
for abuse, existence of approved medical uses, and safety.7 Grading
is according to the quantity of the drug involved: the greater the
quantity, the greater the sentence. Possession of half an ounce of
methamphetamine, for example, is a class C felony, punishable by a
term of imprisonment up to fifteen years.8 Possession of two or
more ounces of methamphetamine, on the other hand, is a class A-II
felony carrying a term of up to life imprisonment. 9
As a result, the drug laws bear a strong resemblance to a
chemistry manifesto. Elaborate tables and charts group drugs with
jawbreaking polysyllabic names;10 each new level of offense recites
which drugs, in what quantity, will yield that provision's particular
range of tough, frequently mandatory sentences.' The statutes
4 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3306 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1999) (listing the controlled
substances by name or chemical designation).
5 Schedule I drugs include opiates, opium derivatives (including heroin and morphine),
hallucinogenic substances (including marijuana, mescaline and peyote), depressants and
stimulants. See id.
6 Schedule V drugs include narcotic drugs containing non-narcotic active medicinal
ingredients, including "[n]ot more than two hundred milligrams of codeine per one hundred
milliliters or per one hundred grams" and certain narcotic drugs and stimulants not
specifically contained in other schedules. Id.
7 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 59.
"Dangerousness" as used here assumes that the drug will be used in the manner and to
the extent necessary to achieve the effect commonly associated with the drug. It
includes the addictive qualities of the drug, the necessity to escalate dosage to obtain the
desired result, the physical and psychological effects upon the user, the user's ability to
control the amount or quality of active ingredient which enters his system, the social
consequences of such use and the extent to which the drug use creates a danger to others
by virtue of the user's reduced ability to conform his behavior to legally acceptable
standards.
Id.
8 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.09(2) (McKinney 2000) (listing the weight and type of
controlled substance necessary for a person to be guilty of criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the fourth degree); id. § 70.00(2)(c) (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999) (outlining the
imprisonment sentences for certain class C felonies).
9 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.18(2) (McKinney 2000) (listing the weight and type of
controlled substance necessary for a person to be guilty of criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the second degree); id. § 70.00(2)(a) (McKinney 1998) (outlining the
imprisonment sentences for class A felonies).
10 See N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 3306 (including drugs named diethylthiambutene,
ethylmethylthiambutene, and levophenacylmorphan).
11 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.03, 220.06, 220.09, 220.16, 220.18, 220.21 (McKinney 2000)
(outlining the quantities and types of controlled substances associated with the specific
degree of offense involving controlled substances); id. §§ 221.10-.55 (McKinney 2000)
(describing the quantities required for conviction of the varying degrees of marijuana
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look, literally, like a war against drugs. People who associate
themselves with a particular quantity of a particular drug are
punished on the theory that these punishments will prevent the
drugs from doing harm. 12
One key assumption upon which this statutory scheme is based is
that there is a tight connection between drugs and harm and
between the nature and quantity of a drug and the harm caused. 13
Some drugs-those "controlled" by the law-cause addiction, social
harm (as drug abusers' lives fall apart), and incidental crime. Of
these controlled substances, some are more addictive than others,
cause more harm, and engender more crime, and therefore need to
be contained by harsher sentences. The greater the quantity of
drug possessed or distributed, the greater the harm unleashed, and
the greater the punishment.
At the Albany Law School Symposium, District Attorney Bruno
maintained that "The Rockefeller Drug Laws Fairly and Effectively
Combat Drug Crime in New York State."'14 That result was
certainly the hope of the 1973 legislature, and of the Temporary
Commission which created the legislation's architecture. 5 The
features of the drug laws just described were expected to deter and
prevent drug abuse and related crimes, while the tight control of
judicial discretion in sentencing was expected to produce fair and
equal punishment. 16
The arguments of three decades ago, explaining the basis of the
choices made by these laws, sounded plausible in the Temporary
Commission's report, and may still sound plausible to many people.
However, after thirty years, we have little basis for evaluating the
design of the Rockefeller drug laws, other than the same speculative
reasoning and wishful thinking that led the Commission and the
legislature to adopt this structure in the first place. The reasoning
possession and sale); see also id. § 70.00 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999) (providing prison
sentences for felonies).
12 See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (questioning the efficiency of these
particular punishments as a means of deterrence).
Is See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text (discussing how the dangerousness and
quantity of drugs dictates the harshness of the sentence).
14 The Honorable Joseph Bruno is the District Attorney for Rensselaer County, New York.
This was the title of his presentation delivered at Albany Law School on November 12, 1999,
a transcription of which has not been reproduced in this issue.
15 See Donnino, supra note 2, at 6-7 (providing a history of how the 1965 version was
amended by the 1973 laws, which were then amended in 1979 to ameliorate sentence severity
to some extent).
16 Of course, the fact that prosecutors still retain discretion in deciding whom to prosecute
means that equality of application is not wholly within the legislature's control.
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may not have been irrational, but was it right? The hope for
fairness in application was sincere, but has it been borne out?
In the past thirty years, we have learned little to confirm the
fairness or effectiveness of the New York drug laws' strategy.17 We
have, however, learned more about the nature of addiction and drug
abuse in ways that should lead us to question some of the
assumptions on which the Rockefeller drug laws rest.
There are three questions we should be asking:
1) Sentence Length. Is the assumption that the harsh sentences
of the Rockefeller drug laws are effective in controlling drug abuse
true? If we are not achieving the results we hoped for, should the
lengths of the sentences in the overall scheme be modified? This
discussion should include utilitarian questions-are the sentence
lengths in fact having the deterrent effect expected? Are they worth
their cost, in taxpayer dollars and impact on the lives of drug
offenders and their families? Would an alternative strategy be
more effective? The discussion should also include a normative
question-are the sentence lengths prescribed truly proportional to
culpability?
2) Legislative Control of Punishment Level. The statutes' creators
assumed that reducing judicial discretion in sentencing, both
through use of mandatory sentencing provisions and through
prescribing as elements of each crime virtually all factors
determining punishment level, would lead to fair and effective
punishment.' 8 Are these assumptions true? Do the statutes strike
an appropriate balance between individualization of sentences and
equal treatment? Should there be more (or less) judicial discretion
in drug offense sentencing? Should sentencing be based on factors
almost exclusively related to the offense, or should offender-related
characteristics play more of a role?
3) Relative Culpability. Are drug offenses intelligently graded
under the Rockefeller drug laws? Should the factors on which
,7 What we have learned tends to point to the conclusion that the laws have been unfair
and ineffective. See infra notes 19-51 and accompanying text (suggesting the Rockefeller
drug laws' imposition of high sentences has been ineffective in accomplishing the goal of
reducing drug abuse and crime); infra notes 52-90 and accompanying text (describing how the
removal of judicial discretion can result in unfair sentencing because judges may only
consider offense-related factors and not offender-related factors).
18 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 59 (describing the Commission's attempt to find "a
rational basis for defining levels of culpability" rather than relying on judicial discretion); see
also Donnino. supra note 2. at 6 (describing how the recommendations of the Commission
influenced the 1973 Penal Law revision).
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grading is based-drug and drug quantity-be virtually exclusive
measures of culpability, as current law prescribes?
This question is inextricably linked to the previous question about
the desirability of judicial discretion in sentencing. It is indeed
rational to minimize judicial discretion in sentencing if the decisions
upon which punishment is to be based are objective, offense-related
factors-what quantity of which drug was involved in a possession
or sale? Judicial discretion would become more appropriate, and
indeed critical, if drug offenses were graded differently-for
example, in a manner requiring assessment of the culpability of
individual offenders.
I. SENTENCE LENGTH
At the time New York's 1973 laws were passed, they were indeed
the nation's toughest drug laws. Governor Rockefeller believed that
drug pushers were responsible for increases in addiction and in non-
drug crime, and declared that the threat of harsh sentences would
"estabhsh an effective deterrent to illegal drug use and drug-related
crime."'19 His favored sentencing structure, in its magnitude and its
rigidity, reflected the opinion of many respondents to
contemporaneous polls that the harm caused by drugs was the most
serious problem facing the nation. 20 Punishment of drug possession
and distribution in New York is still severe. 21 Possession of half an
ounce of methamphetamine, a class C felony,22 is treated as the
equivalent of third degree arson,23 or second degree burglary. 24 Sale
19 WEBSTER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 116.
20 See Arnold D. Hechtman, Practice Commentary, N.Y. PENAL LAW art. 220, at 6
(McKinney 1980) (stating the revisions to the drug laws in 1973 "mirrored many of society's
concerns and attitudes about the problems inherent in and created by drug abuse"). One
recent study concluded that public concern about street crime and drugs is affected more by
definitional activities of state actors and the mass media than by reported incidences of the
problems themselves, and thus public perception of the seriousness of the drug problem is
itself a political phenomenon. See Katherine Beckett, Setting the Public Agenda: "Street
Crime"and Drug Use in American Politics, 41 SOC. PROBS. 425, 444 (1994).
21 See Donnino, supra note 2, at 7 (noting the New York State Legislature did soften some
of the penalty provisions in the 1979 amendments). But see infra notes 22-25 and
accompanying text (comparing drug offenses to serious non-drug offenses).
22 See id. § 220.09(2) (McKinney 2000) (defining the possession of one-half ounce or more of
"preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances" as "criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the fourth degree," which is a class C felony).
23 See id. § 150.10 (McKinney 1999).
24 See id. § 140.25 (McKinney 1999).
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of two ounces of heroin, a class A-I felony, is treated as the
equivalent of murder in the first degree. 25
There has been surprisingly little empirical research seeking to
determine whether such heavy sentences have a deterrent effect on
drug abuse or incidental crime. 26 An evaluation of the 1973 New
York laws conducted several years after their enactment by a
committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and
the Drug Abuse Council concluded that neither of Governor
Rockefeller's objectives had been met: drug availability did not
appear to have been reduced and crime went up, not down.27 The
Commission, however, hedged its conclusion that the drug laws had
been a failure, noting that the laws had not yet been fully
implemented.28
The Commission had no doubt, on the other hand, that the
Rockefeller drug laws were very expensive to implement. 29 If
studies were to support the conclusion that these laws substantially
deter or reduce harm, the lengthy sentences might be deemed worth
both their cost to taxpayers and their cost to people convicted under
the laws and their families.80 If we have no reason to believe that
imposing such high sentences accomplishes what the sentences
were supposed to accomplish, why not reevaluate whether these
laws are worth their costs? It is unclear whether the
25 See id. § 220.43(1) (McKinney 2000) (classifying the sale of two or more ounces of a
controlled substance in the first degree, which includes heroin, as a class A-I felony); id. §
125.27 (McKinney 1998) (categorizing first degree murder as a class A-I felony).
26 See Michael Tonry, Research on Drugs and Crime, in DRUGS AND CRIME 1, 2 (Michael
Tonry & James Q. Wilson eds., 1990).
Although the volume of research on these subjects has increased significantly in recent
years, in absolute terms, drugs and crime research is a minor scholarly activity and is
poorly funded. The literature is scant, much of it is fugitive, the research community is
fragmented, and too much of the research is poor in quality and weak in design.
One striking feature of research on drug policy is its scantiness.
Id. at 2; see also Peter Reuter, Hawks Ascendant: The Punitive Trend of American Drug
Policy, in DRUG USE AND DRUG POLICY 365, 386 (Marilyn McShane & Frank P. Williams III
eds., 1997) (deploring the paucity of research in this area).
27 See WEBSTER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 7-9 (presenting these findings).
28 See id. at 5-26. More recent studies, however, have reached the same conclusion. See
NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION: REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DRUG
POLICY TASK FORCE I (1996) (concluding notwithstanding vast expenditure of public
resources, the drug laws have been a complete failure in all respects); ASSOCIATION OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, A WISER COURSE: ENDING DRUG PROHIBITION (1994)
(concluding "the costs of drug prohibition are simply too high and its benefits too dubious").
29 See id. at 11 (estimating that nearly $32 million was spent in the enforcement and
implementation of the 1973 drug laws).
30 See JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., MANDATORY MINIMUM DRUG SENTENCES:
THROWING AWAY THE KEY OR THE TAXPAYERS' MONEY? 79-80 (1997) (suggesting that




implementation of the drug laws has been effective, and the laws
may actually have a negative impact; as Hippocrates said, "[f]irst,
do no harm."3 '
Doctor Steven Belenko's study3 2 shows that we might be able to
reduce drug abuse and crime more effectively by spending money on
drug treatment in prisons, rather than simply on more
incarceration. Why continue to impose and pay the price for heavy
prison sentences on the untested assumption that this strategy will
have an impact?33 Why not first try to learn whether this strategy
actually works?
A related question is whether incarcerating people convicted of
possessing or distributing relatively small quantities of drugs for
such long periods of time is proportionate to the harm caused.34
One way to frame this question is to ask whether an individual
distributing two ounces of heroin is in fact as culpable as murdering
someone. This is a difficult question to untangle, because the
assumption of the drug laws is that if the quantity of heroin
involved is large enough, many lives may indeed be forfeited. How
is such "harm" or potential harm to be measured?
One useful way to question the correlation of heavy sentences
with possession or distribution of controlled substances is to focus
31 RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS REQUESTED FROM THE
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 163 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989).
32 See Steven Belenko, The Challenges of Integrating Drug Treatment into the Criminal
Justice Process, 63 ALB. L. REV. 833 (2000).
3 Many commentators have argued that alternative strategies might prove more effective
in controlling drug abuse.
According to the Justice Policy Institute, U.S. prison populations will have reached two
million by February 15, 2000. See JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, THE PUNISHING DECADE:
PRISON AND JAIL ESTIMATES AT THE MILLENNIUM 3 (1999). Discussing the Rockefeller drug
laws, Professor John J. DiIulio, Jr. of Princeton recently wrote, "it appears that at least a
quarter of recent admissions to ... [New York's] prisons are 'drug-only offenders,' meaning
felons whose only crimes, detected or undetected, have been low-level, nonviolent drug
offenses." John J. DiIulio Jr., Two Million Prisoners Are Enough, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1999,
at A14.
Professor Dilulio advocates abandoning mandatory minimum drug sentences, and instead
mandating drug treatment programs for offenders. See id. This position is not restricted to
people who believe in decriminalizing drugs. Recently joining Dilulio in calling for drug
treatment as an alternative to incarceration is the White House's director of national drug
policy, Gen. Barry McCaffrey. McCaffrey has commented: 'incarcerating offenders without
treating underlying substance-abuse problems simply defers the time when they are released
back into our communities to start harming themselves and the larger society."' Drug
Treatment Gets a Boost, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1999, at A32.
34 See Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different from All
Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 785-90 (1994) (arguing that governmental decisions to
restrict a person's freedom from incarceration, like the decision to infringe upon any other
fundamental right, should be subjected to strict scrutiny, with the government required to
justify its use of incarceration by demonstrating a compelling interest).
Albany Law Review
on drugs that are available by prescription, and are therefore
generally believed to be benign under some circumstances. Imagine
the following scenario: Two college students are studying for final
exams. Both have been diagnosed as suffering from Attention
Deficit Disorder and both have prescriptions for Ritalin, an
amphetamine currently believed to help many people to focus their
attention. Student B, distracted by his studies, has neglected to get
his prescription refilled. He asks Student A, who has a prescription
for the same drug in the same dosage, to share her Ritalin so that
he will be able to concentrate on his studies.3 5 Depending on the
number of milligrams involved, Student A could be guilty of a class
B felony,3 6 and could be sentenced to up to twenty-five years in
prison37 because Ritalin is an amphetamine, a schedule II drug.38
At the quantity level probably involved, there is considerable
sentencing discretion, so Student A might well receive a relatively
lenient sentence.3 9  More significantly, there is prosecutorial
discretion hidden behind the drug laws, 40 and Student A, if she
encounters a sympathetic prosecutor, might not be prosecuted at
all, or might receive a favorable plea bargain. But, if Student A
encounters a prosecutor and judge who want to send a particularly
strong message about drug sharing, the statute would allow a
maximum sentence of up to twenty-five years for this offense. 41
Would the latter punishment be proportional to the harm done? Is
the mere fact of the distribution of a prescribable drug without a
prescription worthy of such a heavy punishment, even if no actual
35 Because the statutes punish sale more heavily than possession, we will assume that
Student A has asked to be reimbursed for what she paid for her prescription.
86 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.39 (McKinney 2000) (providing that criminal sale in the third
degree includes selling one gram or more of a "stimulant" and is a class B felony); see also id.
§ 220.31 (McKinney 2000) (defining criminal sale in the fifth degree as punishing the sale of
any quantity of a controlled substance, including stimulants, as a class D felony).
37 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(2)(b) (McKinney 1998) (proving that the maximum
sentence for a class B felony is 25 years).
38 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3306, Schedule II(d)(1) (McKinney 1993). Furthermore, if
Student A were at a prep school instead of college, selling even a minimal amount of Ritalin
could be treated as a class C felony. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.34(8), 220.00(14) (McKinney
2000) (stating the sale of any amount of controlled substance at an "educational facility," the
definition of which includes high schools, constitutes criminal sale in the fourth degree).
39 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(3)(b) (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999) (providing that for
non-violent class B felonies the minimum sentence is "fixed by the court" and "shall be not
less than one year nor more than one-third of the maximum term imposed").
40 See People v. Bryant, 398 N.Y.S.2d 216, 221 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) ("Considerable leeway
is accorded the prosecution to determine when proceedings shall be instituted.").
41 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(2)(b) (permitting the judge to fix the sentence, but such
sentence shall not exceed 25 years).
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harm is done? (We will assume that student B, who had been taking
the same drug in the same quantity, and who knows the properties
of the drug, does not suffer any harm.)
Because of the narrow focus on type and quantity of drug, the
drug laws turn out, upon examination, to define anticipatory
offenses. Dissemination of certain drugs is prohibited not because it
will cause certain harm, but because it might cause harm. Should it
matter whether any harm has actually occurred? Should it matter
whether Student A was more or less reckless, perhaps sharing
Ritalin with someone who has never had a prescription for it, who
may not know its properties, and who may suffer side effects?
Some argue that we have proof that our drug sentences are not
disproportionate, in that the courts have found heavy sentences
meted out under the New York State laws for possession or
distribution of a small quantity of drugs not to be
unconstitutional.4 2 It is true that the New York State Court of
Appeals has found the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment
for a drug offense does not comprise cruel and unusual
punishment.43 The courts, however, ask only the most deferential
questions in evaluating the constitutionality of legislation under the
Eighth Amendment (or parallel state constitutional provisions)-
whether the legislation is rational; whether the legislature might
reasonably have thought the harsh sentences would deter and
reduce crime. 44 That the courts defer to the legislature does not
relieve the legislature of the responsibility to make careful policy
decisions. In fact, these judicial opinions demonstrate that it is in
the legislature, and not in the courts, that the real policy decisions
42 The Honorable Joseph Bruno argued this point in his presentation delivered at Albany
Law School on November 12, 1999. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
43 See People v. Broadie, 332 N.E.2d 338, 347 (N.Y. 1975) (affirming the convictions of
eight defendants for possession and/or sale of controlled substances, all class A felonies with
mandatory sentences, ranging from minimums of one or six years to eight and one-third
years, and maximum of life imprisonment); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-
96 (1991) (holding a life sentence without possibility of parole for possession of over 650
grams of cocaine is not cruel and unusual); Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 407, 417 (2d Cir.
1978) (upholding as constitutional a sentence of six years to life for a woman convicted, after
a plea arrangement, of second degree possession of a controlled substance for possession of 3/8
ounces of cocaine).
44 See Broadie, 332 N.E.2d at 341, 347 (holding the legislature did not act irrationally in
deciding the gravity of drug offenses and the deterrent effect of the sentencing statutes). The
court also stated "the narcotics laws are relatively severe, but not irrationally so, given the
epidemic dimensions of the problem." Id. at 345; see also Carmona, 576 F.2d at 410 (stating
courts generally defer to the legislature and "assume the penalty's validity" and explaining
that "a heavy burden rests upon those who make the constitutional challenge").
2000]
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must be made. 45 Courts do not have the social science equipment to
measure whether the legislature's assumptions, either about the
effectiveness of particular sanctions, or about the properties of
particular drugs, are accurate. 6 Courts do not generally believe
that they have the political mandate to formulate drug policy. 47 It
is not the courts, but the legislature, therefore, who will and must
reevaluate from time to time whether a law that appeared to be
rational at the time of its origination has in fact failed the test of
practice.
To fulfill this responsibility, it is time for the New York State
Legislature to commission a study to evaluate what the severity of
drug sentences under the existing laws buys.48 How much impact
do these laws actually have on deterrence of drug use/abuse? To
what extent is there actually a correlation between length of
sentence and deterrence?49  We could also use some reliable
information about the assumption that reducing drug use will lead
to a reduction of incidental crime. The correlation between drug use
and crimes of violence, for example, an article of faith to the
enactors of the Rockefeller drug laws, has been called into
question.5 0 But we still do not have anything resembling an
adequate answer to that question.51
45 See Carmona, 576 F.2d at 409-10 (emphasizing the propriety of a court deferring to
legislative judgment: "[t]he paramount role of determining that the punishment fit the crime
is that of the legislature of the state"); Broadie, 332 N.E.2d at 346 (noting "[t]he statutes were
enacted after thorough investigation" by the legislature).
4 See Broadie, 332 N.E.2d at 346 (citing to various transcripts and reports to demonstrate
the investigative process of the legislature).
47 See id. (explaining that although "the court does not necessarily approve or concur in the
Legislature's judgment in adopting [drug offense] sanctions" they will exercise "judicial
restraint" and respect "the separation of powers"); see also Carmona, 576 F.2d at 410
(emphasizing the importance of the political process and the role of the legislature in enacting
statutes in accordance with the public's standards).
48 The legislature previously concluded, in 1979, that the original Rockefeller drug laws
were too severe and amended them accordingly. See Donnino, supra note 2, at 7.
49 The drug laws, although essentially anticipatory offenses, may nevertheless be regarded
as serving retributive as well as deterrent purposes. It would be helpful, at least, to identify
what the purposes of these punishments are.
50 In lieu of empirical data, myths about drugs and crime have filled the gap. As Tonry
notes, however, from the data that is available, "mythology has been shown to be just that.
We have learned that there is no inexorable connection between drug use and criminality."
Tonry, supra note 26, at 4.
51 See Deborah W. Denno, When Bad Things Happen to Good Intentions: The Development
and Demise of a Task Force Examining the Drugs-Violence Interrelationship, 63 ALB. L. REV.
749 (2000) (stating "the nature and extent of systematic violence is still not entirely clear or
strong, and it appears to vary across time and different types of drug markets").
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II. MANDATORY PUNISHMENTS VS. JuDICIAL DISCRETION
Another central assumption underlying the sentencing structure
of the Rockefeller drug laws is that the certainty of punishment will
contribute to deterrence. 52 The statutes therefore attach mandatory
minimum sentences to some drug offenses (depending again on type
and quantity of drug involved). 53 Here, too, we lack the empirical
data that might enable us to decide whether that operative
assumption is true. How much additional deterrence of drug
use/dissemination is there if it is perceived that punishment will be
swift and certain, as well as severe? So long as we do not really
know the answer to that question, we should look at what we give
up in order to guarantee certainty of punishment. Doctor Belenko's
studies show, for example, that mandatory minimum sentences
make it more difficult to have meaningful drug treatment programs
in prison, because the possibility of bargaining and creating
incentives is reduced. 54 If this is true, the current structure of the
drug laws might even be compromising more effective crime
prevention strategies.
We also sacrifice the judicial discretion that would be necessary to
individualize sentencing. The Temporary Commission, in deciding
on the sentencing scheme embodied in the 1973 legislation,
perceived itself as having to choose between drug laws that would
provide maximum penalties and then permit judges to select a
sentence within the range allowed, and drug laws graded by the
legislature. 55 Like Congress in the Sentencing Reform Act passed
shortly afterwards,56 the Temporary Commission decided againstjudicial discretion, for several reasons. First, the Commission, like
Congress, was concerned about the specter of sentencing disparity if
judges were afforded substantial discretion.57 If the college student
52 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 58 (inferring that since most of the population
does not abuse drugs, the threat of criminal sanctions must have some deterrent effect).
53 Under N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(3)(a) (McKinney 1998), for example, "[i]n the case of a
class A felony, the minimum period shall be fixed by the court and specified in the sentence."
Examples of drug convictions classified as class A felonies include possession of four ounces or
more of any narcotic (class A-I felony), carrying a minimum sentence of imprisonment of
between 15 and 25 years; and possession of two or more ounces of any narcotic (class A-I
felony), carrying a minimum sentence of between three and eight years. See id. §§
70.00(3)(a), 220.18-.21 (McKinney 2000).
5 See Belenko, supra note 32, at 868.
55 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 59 (explaining the need for a "rational basis" in
determining sentences rather than affording "unbridled sentencing discretion" to the courts).
56 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998(1994) (seeking, in 1984, to "provide certainty and fairness" in
federal sentencing).
57 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 59-60.
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sharing her Ritalin receives the same sentence as a person selling
amphetamines in a park, simply because both have disseminated
the same quantity of the same drug, there is no chance that
sentencing judges will impose inconsistent sentences on similar
defendants, or that they will impose different sentences for the
same conduct because they might feel more sympathetic to the
college student. It should be noted, of course, that at the same time
Congress decided to reduce judicial discretion in sentencing,
Congress also delegated its decision-making power respecting the
relative severity of sentences to the quasi-judicial, politically
insulated Sentencing Commission.58 Evidently fearing that political
imperatives could make it impossible for a legislature to produce
sound and careful decisions regarding the criminal justice policy,
Congress bound itself, like Ulysses, to resist the siren's song.
The New York Commission, and then the legislature, decided that
the principal bases for measuring culpability should be drug type
and quantity, and not offender-related factors. 59 Also, like the
federal drug laws, the New York law focuses almost exclusively on
offense-related factors, combined with prior criminal history, and
allows little occasion for individualizing sentences based on the
circumstances of the defendant, or the person to whom drugs have
been disseminated.60
If culpability is to be measured by offense-related factors and a
sentence can, in many cases, be calculated once the drug type,
quantity, and a few other offense-related circumstances (age of the
drug consumer, for instance) are known, then judges have little role
to play.61 In order to decide what drugs are particularly dangerous,
58 See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the
constitutionality of the delegation by Congress to the Sentencing Commission).
59 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 72-78 (setting forth suggested schedules relating
to drug type and quantity); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.18 (McKinney 2000) (classifying
drug crimes by these criteria).
6o See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.18 (setting forth factors to be considered, including
weight and drug type).
61 Prior criminal history is one of the few offender-related factors remaining relevant
under federal or state drug law sentencing. Unlike federal law, the New York State
Legislature built all decisions about drug type and quantity into the statute as elements of
each offense. The prosecution must prove to a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant possessed methamphetamine, in the quantity of one-half ounce. If the jury so
finds, the sentence will follow. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, by way of contrast,
the sentencing judge must often find facts related to drug quantity at sentencing, where the
decision is made without a jury, on a lesser standard of proof. I have previously criticized this
regime, arguing that there is no good reason for splitting offense-related factors and leaving
some to be decided at sentencing. See Susan N. Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog:
Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due
Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 293 (1992). The bifurcation of fact-finding seems to have
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the Temporary Commission heard testimony from a variety of
scientists, including psychopharmacologists, as well as former
addicts. 62 On the basis of their overview of the properties of various
drugs, the Commission and the legislature set out rules concerning
relative culpability.63 Judges at sentencing proceedings are ill-
equipped to take such testimony. Similarly, the Commission's and
the legislature's decisions about what quantity of
methamphetamine is comparable in its harm-producing properties
to what quantity of cocaine seem more appropriately legislative
than judicial choices. To decide what quantities to plug into their
grid, the Commission studied street prices of various drugs, and
heard testimony about how long the average addict might take a
particular quantity of a drug before wanting to increase quantity.64
This is a legislative, not a judicial, inquiry.
Again, the Commission's and the legislature's choices are
rational, but only if the assumptions on which those choices were
based are not called into question. If type and quantity of drug are
not the only meaningful indicators of increased culpability of a drug
offender, our conclusions about who is the better decision maker
might change, depending on what factors are deemed relevant.
Again, the simple connection the statute draws between drug
type/quantity and harm turns out to be foundational. Compare
Student A, who shared a certain quantity of Ritalin with a student
whose prescription had lapsed, with a defendant who has sold the
same quantity of an identical amphetamine in the park, not
knowing whether the consumer was familiar with the drug and its
properties, whether the consumer was about to drive a car, whether
the consumer was pregnant, whether the consumer might take too
high a dosage, and whether the consumer might suffer serious side
effects. It is certainly arguable that the student is less culpable
than this latter drug seller, because the connection between
been a product of the procedure by which Congress delegated decisions to the Sentencing
Commission, rather than of any reasoning process. See id. at 295-99.
Under federal law, a defendant's exposure at sentencing is increased by the fact that under
federal conspiracy law, which still adheres to the Pinkerton doctrine, a defendant convicted of
selling of a small quantity of drugs may receive a heavily enhanced sentence if the small
quantity was obtained from a large shipment considered to amount to "relevant conduct."
See, e.g., United States v. Silverman, 889 F.2d 1531 (6th Cir. 1989) (sentencing defendant for
possession of one kilo of cocaine rather than the quarter ounce alleged and proved at trial).
New York law avoids these pitfalls.
62 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 96-134 (listing and summarizing the testimony of
witnesses who testified at the Commission's hearings).
63 See id. at 59-68 (proposing incremental penalties for drug offenders based on'the type
and quantity of drugs involved).
r See id. at 80 (presenting, in chart format, its findings regarding drug pricing).
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dissemination of the drug and harm seems far weaker in the former
setting than in the latter.
During the past thirty years, there has been considerable
discussion about the interrelationship of drugs, addiction, and
harm. The apparent assumption of the Temporary Commission that
culpability can be determined simply by the psychopharmacological
properties of a drug has been undermined by development of a more
nuanced picture of how drug addiction works. Doctor Norman
Zinberg, for example, studied American veterans who had been
addicted, while serving in Vietnam, to heroin or other "hard" drugs,
questioning why so many found it easy to kick their habits on
returning home.65 Zinberg concluded that the nature of a drug
being used is only one of several factors affecting addiction.66 The
other decisive factors he referred to as the "set"-the genetic and
psychological features of the individual drug user-and the
"setting"-the individual's community and context in which drug
use occurs.
67
Zinberg is far from alone in doubting that the pharmacology of a
drug produces addiction in the direct way the Commission assumed
thirty years ago. 68 Many have noted that use of a particular drug in
a particular quantity does not affect everyone similarly.69 Some
people use cocaine recreationally over a period of years and do not
radically increase their dosage, do not lose their jobs, and maintain
good relationships with their families. 70 Others, who take the same
quantity of the same drug, have radically different experiences-
because of their set and their setting-just as people have differing
abilities to control their use of alcohol.7 1
6 See NORMAN E. ZINBERG, DRUG, SET, AND SETTING: THE BASIS FOR CONTROLLED
INTOXICANT USE 12-15 (1984) (noting that recidivism to addiction was only 12% within three
years of returning to the United States from Vietnam).
6 See id. (stating that social and psychological factors also play a role).
67 See id. at 5. The three factors to consider in determining what makes a person use illicit
drugs and what effect the drugs will have on the user are: "drug (the pharmacological action
of the substance itself, set (the attitude of the person at the time of use, including his
personality structure), and setting (the influence of the physical and social setting within
which the use occurs)." Id.
68 See, e.g., Ethan A. Nadelmann, Thinking Seriously About Alternatives to Drug
Prohibition, in DRUG USE AND DRUG POLICY 269, 286 (Marilyn McShane & Frank P.
Williams III eds., 1997) (agreeing that set and setting are relevant to addiction).
69 See RICHARD LAWRENCE MILLER, THE CASE FOR LEGALIZING DRUGS 2-4 (1991) (noting
the effect of a drug is dependent on several factors such as purity, set, setting, tolerance, and
addiction).
1o See ZINBERG, supra note 65, at 1-3 (describing the example of a twenty-six year old
white male who engages in recreational drug use and how such drug use generally has no
"significant" impact on his life).
71 See id. at 5.
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Some critics of the drug laws take the work of Zinberg and others
as one basis for concluding that criminalizing drug use is a poor
strategy generally.72 Zinberg notes, for example, that as long as
substances are subject to strict prohibition, communities are less
likely to develop norms about how to use various substances
safely.73 He points to the prohibition of alcohol during the 1920s as
having delayed the development and enforcement of community
norms that can make abuse of alcohol less likely, and use of alcohol
safer. 74  Alcohol harm reduction techniques, like declaring a
designated driver or having teenage children sign contracts with
their parents for chauffeuring any family member who has had too
much to drink, have only recently replaced the societal norm of
having "one for the road," as we have moved further beyond
Prohibition. 75
One reason why there has been resistance to reevaluating the
assumptions on which drug laws like New York's are based is that
relatively little has been written about drug law and policy outside
the context of debates on decriminalization, 76 and discussion of
72 See, e.g., DOUGLAS N. HuSAK, DRUGS AND RIGHTS 100-04 (1992) (contending that if drug
use is motivated by autonomous choice, rather than by addiction, the regulation of drugs
looses its primary justification).
73 See ZINBERG, supra note 65, at 193-98 (critiquing the current social policy on drugs).
74 See id. at 9 (setting forth the chronology of social customs regarding alcohol).
75 See id. at 9-10 (discussing the creation and internalization of social sanctions).
76 For representative writings arguing that drug prohibition, as embodied in the
Rockefeller drug laws, is necessarily a failure, and proposing alternatives, see generally: THE
CRISIS IN DRUG PROHIBITION (David Boaz ed., 1990) (advocating the decriminalization and
legalization of drug use); DEALING WITH DRUGS: CONSEQUENCES OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL
(Ronald Hamowy ed., 1987) (discussing the harmful effects of drug prohibition and
recommending the formulation of new approaches to drug abuse); HUSAK, supra note 72
(questioning the government's authority to criminalize recreational drug use); DRUG
PROHIBITION AND THE CONSCIENCE OF NATIONS (Arnold S. Trebach & Kevin B. Zeese eds.,
1990) (suggesting four considerations necessary in improving drug policy); ERICH GOODE,
BETWEEN POLITICS AND REASON: THE DRUG LEGALIZATION DEBATE (1997) (criticizing
current drug policies and outlining a variety of alternative approaches); MILLER, supra note
69 (1991) (contending that the war on drugs is, in actuality, a war on individual freedom and
democracy); SEARCHING FOR ALTERNATIVES: DRUG-CONTROL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
(Melvyn B. Krauss & Edward P. Lazear eds., 1991) (presenting economic, social, legal, and
medical implications of drug use); ARNOLD S. TREBACH, THE GREAT DRUG WAR: AND
RADICAL PROPOSALS THAT COULD MAKE AMERICA SAFE AGAIN (1987) (arguing that the
current war on drugs is proceeding in the wrong direction and proposing alternative methods
of combating drug use); STEVEN WISOTSKY, BREAKING THE IMPASSE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS
(1986) (demonstrating the failure of the war on drugs and proposing a new solution); Ethan
A. Nadelmann, supra note 68 (seeking common ground in the drug policy spectrum); Ethan A.
Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives,
245 SCI. 939 (1989) (questioning the current approach of the criminal justice system); Ira
Glasser, American Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow, 63 ALB. L. REV. 703 (2000) (contending
the greatest damage done by drugs is not the drugs themselves or their pharmacological
effects, but by the effects of the laws and policies that have been designed to deal with drugs);
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decriminalization is, in many circles, considered anathema. Some of
the voices challenging the link between drugs and violent crime,
and some of those arguing that drug treatment is more effective
than harsh criminal justice policy, conclude that drugs should be
decriminalized.7 But one need not follow the reasoning all the way
to decriminalization. The research of Zinberg and others, teaching
us that addiction is a complex phenomenon,7 8 can also help us to
decide how to measure culpability when distribution of drugs is
being criminalized. We can, for example, use some of this
information to ask more nuanced questions about how to grade drug
offenses. 79
There is no reason to disregard widely accepted medical
discoveries simply because some people make unpopular or
controversial arguments based on that information. If, as it seems
impossible to doubt, drug addiction is actually caused by a
combination of factors, should drug sentencing be based only on
one? Might it be more appropriate to grade drug offenses according
to the mens rea of a defendant-was the defendant relatively
reckless in not learning anything about the "set" and "setting" of a
consumer, or relatively careful in finding out that the consumer had
a prescription for the same quantity of the same drug? Would it be
more appropriate to take into account whether any sort of harm
actually occurred? The proposition that culpability might be
relative need not go so far as to say that the college student who
shared, or sold, her Ritalin should not be punished at all.80
Our ideas about the nature and social meaning of drug "abuse"
have also been challenged by our developing knowledge about the
nature of the human brain. In the past thirty years, the medical
use of psychopharmacological drugs has exploded. Hardly a week
passes without stories in news magazines and on television
James Ostrowski, The Moral and Practical Case for Drug Legalization, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV.
607 (1990) (arguing that both the concept of individual liberty and drug prohibition's cost to
society warrant the legalization of drugs).
17 See supra note 76.
78 See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text (discussing modern research and the
nature of drug addiction).
79 When is an additional ten years of incarceration justified because the amount of drugs
involved has increased? The statutory calibrations have the air of objectivity, but could be
nothing more than educated guesswork. Are these calibrations truly proportional to
culpability?
80 One classic problem of criminal law is how far to go in encouraging people committing
crimes to do so more carefully, rather than holding them strictly liable for all consequences of
their actions, no matter how unforeseen. See, e.g., Regina v. Faulkner, [1877] 11 I.R. 8
(holding that a sailor who was stealing rum from the hold of a ship was not guilty of arson
when he accidentally started a fire by lighting a match during his. theft).
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discussing the latest research on brain chemistry and on how
certain undesirable behavior can be corrected by ingestion of some
chemical or herb, sometimes requiring prescriptions, and sometimes
not.81  When the Temporary Commission looked at abuse of
amphetamines over thirty-five years ago, the idea of using Ritalin to
address "hyperkinesis" was new and strange.8 2 The authors of the
report seemed confounded by the notion that Ritalin might have an
ameliorative effect on what they pronounced an organic brain defect
which disappears at the onset of puberty.8 3 Our current knowledge
and beliefs about Attention Deficit Disorders, in children and
adults, lead us to conclude that many people have chemical deficits
of one sort or another, to one degree or another, and that many
people self-medicate-some with prescription amphetamines, others
with non-prescription amphetamines, some with herbs like Gingko
Biloba, and some with caffeine. Some of those people have more
side effects from heavy doses of caffeine than they would have from
Ritalin.
How should our developing picture of the relationship of drugs
and the brain affect our view of the Rockefeller drug laws? First, we
may need to reexamine some of the earlier characterizations of
which drugs are "dangerous." Many critics have questioned why the
schedules criminalize some substances, like amphetamines or
cocaine, and not others, like alcohol and tobacco, that are at least as
closely linked with the types of harm the drug laws target.8 4 Some
of those critics do arrive at the conclusion that drugs should be
decriminalized. However, should that be a reason to resolutely
ignore the questions they raise, at least as they pertain to the
grading and calibration of punishment for drug offenses?
81 See, e.g., Hyla Cass, Women and Depression: Choosing Complementary Care, TOTAL
HEALTH, Sept. 1, 1999, at 38 (reporting on the differences in treating women for depression
with holistic medicines, as compared to anti-depressant prescription drugs); Geoffrey Cowley
& Anne Underwood, What Is SAMe, NEWSWEEK, July 5, 1999, at 46 (reporting on the uses
and effects of the SAMe, a molecule present in all living things, recently introduced as a
supplement, that has been used to treat both arthritis and depression); Jenny Deam, Problem
or Solution? Medical Professionals Debate the Safety of Supplements, DENVER ROcKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 24, 1999, at 3D (reporting on the medical community's divergent
response to the boom in "herb" dietary supplements, including ginkgo biloba and St. John's
wort); Judy Foreman, Researchers Look Beyond Prozac, STAR-TRIBUNE NEWSPAPER OF THE
TWIN CITIES, Mar. 21, 1999, at 3E (discussing modern anti-depressant drugs).
82 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 81 (discussing how Ritalin was first used in 1959
to treat hyperkinesis).
83 See id. (stating hyperactivity is spontaneously corrected upon the onset of puberty and
that Ritalin reduces hyperactivity, thereby enabling a child to "function more effectively in
schoor').
84 See, e.g., GOODE, supra note 76, at 24-32 (suggesting that the definition of drug abuse
should not be based on notions of "abuse," but instead on "harm").
2000]
Albany Law Review [Vol. 63
One could also reexamine the earlier decisions to include and
exclude particular substances. One of the factors affecting where
drugs were placed on the schedules was whether there was an
accepted medical use for a particular drug.85 Ritalin has a place on
its schedule as a controlled substance because it must be prescribed,
while caffeine is not on the schedule because it does not have to be
prescribed. Ritalin is considered less dangerous than some other
controlled substances, however, because there is an accepted
medical use for it.86 Conversely, marijuana is on the schedule
because it has no accepted medical use, is a controlled substance
and, therefore, may not be prescribed.87 The State of California
may not authorize the medical use of marijuana because it is on the
federal list of controlled substances and is therefore not available to
be used medically.88 How much circularity is there in the seemingly
objective conclusions underlying the very scientific looking drug
schedules? 89
To what extent do we also need to reexamine our conclusions
about the objectivity of the connection between drug quantity and
culpability? The recent federal fiasco with assessing the relative
dangerousness of crack and powder cocaine 90 should lead us to be
85 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 81-88 (describing the medical uses of various
classes of drugs).
8 See id. at 81-83 (discussing amphetamines such as Ritalin and their extensive medical
use to treat such conditions as narcolepsy, hyperactivity, and obesity).
87 See id. at 87-88 (stating there is no medical use for hashish, which is the resin of the
cannabis plant from which marijuana is derived).
8 See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1994) (federal controlled substance schedule). California's new
law-the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1991
& Supp. 2000)-"exempts medical marijuana users and their primary caregivers from
criminal prosecution for possession or cultivation of marijuana." Suzanne D. McGuire,
Comment, Medical Marijuana: State Law Undermines Federal Marijuana Policy-Is the
Establishment Going to Pot?, 7 SAN JOAQUIN AGRic. L. REv. 73, 92 (1997) (footnote omitted).
In response to this California initiative, however, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) issued a statement maintaining the
possibility of federal criminal prosecutions, as well as a threat of DEA registration revocation
and the denial of Medicare reimbursement for doctors who "prescribe" marijuana usage. See
Allison L. Bergstrom, Medical Use of Marijuana: A Look at Federal & State Responses to
California's Compassionate Use Act, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 155, 167 (1997) (citing the
Drug Enforcement Administration's Response to the Passage of California Proposition 215
and Arizona Proposition 200, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164 (1997)). Of course, some of this battle is
about federal supremacy and whether a state legislature has power to redefine what
substances are to be controlled in the face of federal law.
9 See GOODE, supra note 76, at 23-24 (discussing the circularity of legalistic definitions of
drug abuse, for example, defining drug abuse as "any and all illegal drug use").
90 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99.570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) was passed
"in a climate in the Congress that some have characterized as frenzied."' William Spade, Jr.,
Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 1233,
1250 (1996) (quoting Eric E. Sterling, Hearings Before the United States Sentencing
Commission on Proposed Guideline Amendments (Mar. 22, 1993)). One of the law's main
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cautious in assuming the validity of the lines we have drawn. Is
sentencing really fair and equal if it is based on chemical
measurements? Not if the assumptions behind the measurements
are unreliable.
III. MEASURING HARM VS. MEASURING DRUGS
Significant variations on the current drug laws might well
enhance the fairness of sentencing. We might pay more attention to
actual harm, rather than to the anticipatory harm of disseminating
drugs, or to the mens rea of defendants rather than simply the
quantity and chemical properties of the drugs involved. However,
individualizing sentences might lead to sentencing disparities with
middle-class college students possibly receiving relatively lenient
sentences, perhaps for the wrong reasons. It may be that the
current myopic focus on drug type and quantity, even if crude, will
ultimately seem preferable to a harm-based drug punishment
scheme, because it at least does have the virtue of treating people
equally, while discriminating among drugs.91 But after three
decades, is it not worth reexamining whether this grading concept
has been successful?
The legislature has recently made significant decisions modifying
the drug laws, cutting in two different directions. One veered away
from a mens rea-based approach. The New York Court of Appeals,
in People v. Ryan,92 held the prosecution is required to prove the
features was the creation of a penalty ratio of 100 to 1 for crack cocaine and powder cocaine,
respectively. See id. at 1252. The legislative history, however, "contains no [policy]
discussion of the 100:1 crack/powder cocaine ratio." Id. The bill's development bypassed
much of the traditional deliberative congressional process where these issues might have
been debated: the bill was not submitted to a subcommittee, nor based on hearings. See id.
"Read as a whole, the abbreviated legislative history of the 1986 Act does not provide a single,
consistently cited rationale for the crack-powder penalty structure." Id. at 1254-55. In
practice, the 100:1 ratio produced disparate penalties, primarily with respect to African-
Americans, prompting angry criticism of Congress's motivation. See id. at 1255. Both houses
of Congress subsequently rejected a recommendation by the Sentencing Commission to end
the 100:1 ratio and substitute a 1:1 ratio. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for
United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25074 (1995) (setting forth the Commission's arguments
for amending the sentencing guidelines to control the growing gap between sentences
imposed on whites and minorities by adopting a harm-specific sentence structure); Pub. L.
No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334 (1995) (rejecting the Sentencing Commission's recommendations for
changing the sentence structure guidelines for cocaine offenses).
91 The federal crack/cocaine experience also suggests that it would be useful to study the
impact of the seemingly objective categorization of drugs, to determine whether disparities in
application run along fault lines of race, etc. In addition, study of prosecutorial discretion in
applying the drug laws would be a necessary prerequisite to concluding that the laws are
being administered fairly.
92 626 N.E.2d 51 (N.Y. 1993).
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defendant knew the quantity of drug involved was prohibited by the
statutes penalizing distribution of particular quantities of a drug. 93
Ryan's offense involved, what Ryan believed to be, a package of
hallucinogenic mushrooms and resulted in an indictment for
"attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the
second degree."94 The legislature promptly reacted to this decision
by rewriting the statutes to make it clear the defendant's mens rea
did not matter.9 5 The drug laws took another step in the direction
of strict liability.
The other recent legislative decision moved in the direction of
individualizing sentences, even at the price of making conviction of
a greater offense somewhat more difficult.96 The Commission's
original scheme, in measuring quantity, looked at the aggregate
weight of compounds containing a controlled substance. 97 This
approach did not require substantial lab time to analyze the
composition of a substance, just a scale to weigh the aggregate
substance. Of course, basing punishment on the combined weight of
a controlled substance and its medium can lead to incongruous
results. In Chapman v. United States,98 the Supreme Court
reviewed a case in which a defendant had received a minimum
sentence of five years for distributing a quantity of LSD on a piece
of blotter paper, 99 when that same defendant would have received a
sentence of only fourteen months for distributing that same
quantity of LSD in its pure form, without the blotter paper. 00 The
Court, using the same deferential lens it did in reviewing the issue
93 See id. at 52 (noting that "knowingly" applies to the amount of the drug); see also NEW
YORK PENAL LAW § 220.18(5) (McKinney 2000) (noting it is a felony to "knowingly and
unlawfully possess[ ] ... six hundred twenty-five milligrams" of a hallucinogen).
94 See Ryan, 626 N.E.2d at 52-53 (noting that what Ryan believed to be hallucinogens was
actually a substitute package stuffed with newspaper).
95 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.20(4) (McKinney 1998).
Notwithstanding the use of the term "knowingly" in any provision of this chapter
defining an offense in which the aggregate weight of a controlled substance or
marihuana is an element, knowledge by the defendant of the aggregate weight of such
controlled substance or marihuana is not an element of any such offense and it is not,
unless expressly so provided, a defense to a prosecution therefor that the defendant did
not know the aggregate weight of the controlled substance or marihuana.
Id.
96 By requiring the pure weight of the drug to be determined, there are greater laboratory
costs since the separation of the drug from its medium is often a time-consuming process. See
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 21 at 60 (discussing a situation where drug seizures would
require 25 hours of laboratory procedures to obtain evidence for a conviction).
97 See id. at 60 n.* (noting "a superficial inequity in this" measurement scheme).
98 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
99 See id. at 455-56 (noting the pure weight of the drug was only 50 milligrams).
100 See id. at 474 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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of cruel and unusual punishment, held that the legislative
treatment of the issue of purity versus aggregation was not
irrational. 101 Fortunately, the New York legislature was willing to
go beyond this form of "rationality" and make its own policy decision
about how to measure culpability in this instance. 10 2 The revised
law focuses more on the weight of controlled substance involved,
rather than basing punishment on the weight of the medium;
therefore, differences in sentence level will not depend on whether
the same quantity of LSD is distributed in a cup, on a sugar cube, or
a piece of paper. 10 3 Unfortunately, there have not been many other
significant revisions.
CONCLUSION
Three decades is a long time to have such starkly dramatic
legislative decisions go, for the most part, unexamined. The
deferential courts will not second-guess decisions regarding what
sentence length is appropriate, any more than they will second
guess legislative decisions on what should be treated as an element
of a crime and what should be treated as a sentencing factor. 10 4
Consequently, the courts are not having discussions that would help
a responsible legislature review its own work. Neither are the
social scientists who, for whatever reasons, have not frequently
been inspired to study the effectiveness of various drug strategies.
Most of the talking heads interested in discussing drug policy are
debating decriminalization, an option the New York legislature is
unlikely to find interesting any time soon. But many of these
discussions contain valuable information and ideas useful in
recalibrating decisions about how drug laws should be graded.
These sources of information should not be shunned just because
they are associated with conclusions that may be viewed as radical.
Legislators who want to know whether the assumptions
underlying the Rockefeller drug laws are actually true have several
options. One is to commission some new, pointed studies. Another
is to review the critiques, arguments, and information in the
101 See id. at 465 ("We find that Congress had a rational basis for its choice of penalties ...
. 13).
102 See generally N.Y. PENAL LAW art. 220 (McKinney 2000) (setting the level of crime for
most drug offenses on the basis of pure weights).
103 See id. §§ 220.09(6), 220.16(10), 220.18(5) (McKinney 2000) (providing the degree of
criminal possession depends solely on the weight of the hallucinogen).
104 See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) ("[T]he state legislature's
definition of the elements of the offense is usually dispositive.").
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existing literature, even if the authors of those works ultimately
take controversial or unpopular positions. The most important
course of action is to reopen the debate. Perhaps the existing drug
laws appear, on their surface, to be rational, but that may only
remain true if we are careful not to ask too many questions about
the assumptions on which those laws are based. Our knowledge
about drug abuse, addiction, and the human brain has grown
remarkably in the past three decades, but our criminal solution to
the problems engendered by drugs has hardly moved at all. In the
next millennium, can drug laws move beyond presumed rationality?
